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REFERENCE AND EXISTENCE 
by Lyle Angene 
It is unwise to begin a paper with an apology, so I begin with a confession. 
I am interested in what might have been but will not be. Might certain things 
which do or will exist have been a certain way even though they never will 
be so? Might certain things though they never will exist have existed never- 
theless? Are there any interesting differences between these last two ques- 
tions? 
Derivative from these possibly bizarre interests are other concerns. Can 
we talk significantly about things which never will exist? Can we think about 
such things? Can we imagine them? If we can talk and think about things 
which might have existed but never will, how can we do so without quickly 
lapsing into nonsense? 
One source of my embarrassment in revealing these interests is that they 
are exceedingly vague. By this I do not simply mean that on some moderately 
rigorous standard ofphilosophical clarity the questions of the preceding 
paragraphs are open to charges of unclarity and imprecision. One does not 
need a standard to detect paradigm cases of vagueness. A second source of 
embarrassment is that I cannot say just why I am interested in these questions. 
Supposing there were a rough way of isolating genuine philosophical issues 
from spurious ones, it is by no means clear that the pursuit of my interests 
will Iead to genuine philosophical issues of some importance. But the greatest 
source of embarrassment is the worry that I am setting out to clarify and 
answer questions that ought to be "dissolved" instead. As was pointed out 
to me by Stephen Sutton, a graduate student at Rice, although you might 
not be able to have a fox chase without a fox, a wild goose chase does not 
require a wild goose. 
My point in bothering you with this confession is to explain what I am 
trying to do in this paper and why I am attempting to do it. I presently see 
no direct way of dealing with the issues mentioned in my first paragraph. 
But I do think some progress can be made on what I have called derivative 
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issues. And in dealing with these derivative issues I have found nothing more 
provocative and hence helpful than some of Professor Gilbert Ryle's early 
logical works. 
I 
Can one imagine things which might have existed but never will? One's 
first reaction here is, "of course." There is Puff the magic dragon, Pegasus 
the winged horse, and the notorious Mr. Pickwick. Not only do there seem 
to be certain individual things which we can imagine even though they will 
never exist, there seem to be many sorts of things of which there never will 
be any instances, e.g., centaurs, unicorns, griffins, time-travel machines, and 
pumpkins which turn into coaches. Yet, here is at least one case where the 
citing of examples is not conclusive, for it isnot clearjust what these examples 
are examples of since it is not clear how we are to construe these so-called 
make-believe, mythological, and fictional entities. 
Possibly a more fruitful approach would be to follow up some of Professor 
Ryle's remarks about imagination. Ryle notes that "we may imagine some- 
thing to be the case with a 'real' object, as when I imagine, for the purposes 
of an historical romance, Socrates as being a bachelor or a coward. . . ."' Ryle 
gives to this "type" of imagining the tag "non-fabulous imagining." The 
possibility of non-fabulous imagining seems to entail the possibility of imag- 
ining things which do (or did) exist to have properties or characteristics 
which they never had nor ever will have. Thus, I can imagine Socrates as 
a coward or perhaps myself as the editor of Mind. Care needs to be taken 
in how one describes what is imagined in these instances. I am not imagining 
Socrates as an imaginary coward nor myself as an imaginary editor of Mind. 
Rather what I am imagining to be the case is that Socrates be cowardly in 
just the way that real cowards are and that I be the editor of Mind in just 
the way that Professor Ryle was. Thus, noticing that there is such a thing 
as non-fabulous imagining and noticing what this involves leads us to admit 
that it is indeed possible to imagine that certain particular things which do 
exist have certain specific properties or characteristics which in fact they never 
had nor ever will have. 
But if we grant that the sort of non-fabulous imagining described above 
is possible, notice what seems to result. Surely if we can imagine that Socrates 
be a coward, we can also imagine that each of the 501 Athenians who sat 
on his jury be blessed with greater philosophic insight than they in fact 
possessed. And if this is imaginable, it is also imaginable that the verdict at 
Socrates' trial might have been different. We can imagine Socrates being 
sentenced to chisel a statue of Apollo to be placed in the Agora. And given 
Socrates' respect for the law, it is easy to imagine that he carry out this sen- 
tence. But notice what we havejust imagined. If we imagine Socrates carrying 
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his imagined sentence we imagine coming into existence a statue (the 
socrates Apollo) which never existed. We have imagined a statue which never 
did exist. We have been led by our non-fabulous imagining to a case of 
fabulous imagining.' 
Lest the above example seem to exploit the ambiguities connected with 
the notion of artistic creativity, it should be noted that similar cases without 
this feature are possible. It is imaginable that Joan of Arc not have been 
executed at an early age. And if it is imaginable that Socrates be a coward, 
it also seems imaginable that Joan of Arc cease to be a virgin, conceive, and 
bear a daughter. But Joan's daughter, whom we have imagined coming into 
existence, did not exist and never will. And thus by a series of non-fabulous 
imaginings we have imagined a person who never will exist. 
At this point the early Ryle, whom I am using to keep me honest, has a 
ready objection. 
All imagining is imagining that something is the case. The correct form of reply 
to the question What are you imagining? would be to state a complete proposition, 
prefaced by a 'that'. It would be incorrect to reply by naming or describing a thing. 
. . . And if I can show, as I have to do anyhow, that the cases which one would feel 
tempted to describe as imagining a person or imagining a thing are really cases of 
Imagining that something is the case, I think I shall have done all that is required 
of me.3 
Before looking at the reasons behind Ryle's objection, let us see how he 
applies his view to cases of the sort sketched above. In the course of trying 
to explain what is involved in constructive fabulous imagining,4 Ryle asks, 
"What then is Dickens doing when he is doing what we would find natural 
to describe as 'creating' one of his characters, say, Mr. P i ck~ ick?"~  Ryle's 
answer is that "What Dickens did was to compound a highly complex predi- 
cate and pretend that someone had the characters so ~ignified."~ 
Applying the suggested treatment to our Socrates Apollo, we get something 
like the following: When I said that we were imagining a statue which never 
will exist, what we were really doing is constructing a complex of characters 
(being a statue, being placed in the Agora, being fashioned by Socrates, etc.), 
and imagining or pretending that something had these characters. But is this 
so? To be sure we were imagining that the Socrates Apollo had these charac- 
teristics. Yet it is clear from other remarks Ryle makes that this is not what 
he meant. When Ryle talks about imagining or pretending that something 
has certain characters, it is clear that he means some existent thing. But were 
we imagining that some existent thing had the characters of being a statue, 
being placed in the Agora, being fashioned by Socrates in fulfillment of his 
sentence, etc.? At least it is clear that we did not have some particular existing 
thing in mind which we were imagining to have these characteristics. That 
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is, we were not thinking of some actual statue created by Praxiteles that it 
had been fashioned by Socrates. Of course one can think that something or 
other from among all the things that exist has certain characteristics without 
having any particular thing in mind. But is this what we were doing? 
Were we supposing that some one or other among all the statues that ever 
will exist had the characteristics we imagined the Socrates Apollo to have? 
I do not think so. For notice that if this were what we were doing, our imagin- 
ing would be a case of non-fabulous imagining. We would be imagining 
something which exists (though we know not which thing) to be characterized 
in a certain way. And this does not seem a fair statement of what we were 
doing. We were engaged in fabulous imagining. We had imagined coming 
into existence something which never did nor never will exist. By this point 
we were no longer imagining that among the things which exist certain ones 
(we know not which) were characterized in certain ways. Rather, we were 
imagining that a certain statue (we know which) which never will exist was 
characterized in certain ways. We were, if you like, imagining that the class 
of all statues include a member which it never will. 
11 
We are now in a position to see what is strange about Ryle's treatment 
of Mr. Pickwick. Ryle tells us that what Dickens did in creating Mr. Pickwick 
was "to compound a highly complex predicate and pretend that someone 
had the characters so ~ignified."~ Ryle attempts to bring out the plausibility 
of this position by asking us to suppose that by sheer chance there was a 
person of whom the complex predicate created by Dickens was in fact true. 
Ryle then says: 
Then we could say that Dickens' propositions were true of somebody. (Dickens 
would not, of course, have been an historian, for he invented his propositions and 
d ~ d  not found them on evidence.) But it seems obvious that we could not say of the 
real Mr. Pickwick, 'Oh, he is not identical with the hero of the story.' For his own 
life is ex hypotkesi faithfully recorded there. We could now understand the whole 
story as before and know as well that there was such a man, And we should not dream 
of saying that there were two heroes of the story, one real and one imaginary, and 
the real one was exactly similar to, though numerically different from, the imaginary 
one. On the contrary, we should say that while previously we had thought Pickwick 
Papers was only apretence biography, we now find that, by coincidence, it is a real 
one! 
The suggestion that one could unknowingly (by sheer coincidence) write 
a biography is bothersome, and not just because it would take such a remark- 
able series of coincidences. Just as one could not unknowingly be someone's 
biographer, it seems that one could not unknowingly write someone's biog- 
raphy. Yet I do not want to make too much of this point. 
The chief worry that I have with Ryle's remarks quoted just above is that 
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even in the imagined circumstances it seems incorrect to say that the real 
(recently discovered) Mr. Pickwick is the hero of Dickens' story, i.e., it seems 
incorrect to say that Dickens' story is about the real Mr. Pickwick. Of course 
we can and do talk about people or things without knowing whom or what 
we are talking about. I can cast aspersions on the individual who dropped 
a banana peel on the sidewalk without in any sense knowing who did so. 
But Dickens' remarks are not of this sort. Dickens does have a definite indi- 
viduaI in mind, and so the question of whom if anyone he is talking about 
is not to be decided by discovering whom if anyone his remarks are true of 
(that is, by discovering who if anyone has the characteristics Dickens ascribes 
to Mr. Pickwick). 
Objections arise. What is meant when I speak of having some definite 
individual in mind when the "individual" i11 question is one who never will 
exist? How can one even talk about individuals which never will exist? Is 
not one involved in some sort of contradiction when one speaks of the charac- 
teristics of nonexistent objects? I shall briefly discuss each of these three 
objections. 
How is it possible to have some dejinite individual in mind when the "indi- 
vidual" in question is one who never will exist? I believe that this is a question 
that bothered Ryle when he wrote "Imaginary Objects." Ryle observes in 
a parenthetical remark, "I fancy that only then is a proposition 'about' some- 
thing when it makes sense to ask of it not merely 'what is it about?' but 'which 
of the so-and-so's is it  about?'"^^ questions of the latter sort make sense 
when one is speaking of nonexistent individuals? In the case of the Socrates 
Apollo, could one not only say what sort of statue he had in mind, but which 
statue as well? Here it is important to note that certain techniques are not 
available. Sometimes we can indicate which statue we are talking.about by 
pointing to a particular statue, but one cannot point to nonexistent statues. 
But although pointing is often a clear way of identifying which individuaI 
we are talking about, it is probably not the most frequently used method. 
In linguistic communication any one of the various referring devices can be 
employed. In suitable circumstances we could use either a name or a descrip- 
tion to refer to the individual in question. At this point we have already 
moved to the second objection raised above, for how can we describe or name 
what never will exist? Before turning directly to this objection there are a 
few points connected with the first objection that need to be made. 
There are genuine worries about the sense in which the Socrates Apollo 
is a definite individual. Exactly how tall is it? Precisely how much does it 
weigh? What sort of stone is it made of, and from what part of the ancient 
world did this stone come? We can either say that there are no answers to 
these questions or else ask for a little time to make up answers. Obviously 
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neither of these responses is appropriate in the case of some particular existing 
statue. Also, however difficult it might be in practice, it makes sense to set 
about counting the number of actual statues sculpted by a given sculptor. 
But counting the statues which Socrates has been or could be imagined to 
have sculpted is at best an enterprise which can be given a sense. Before one 
could even begin this latter task one would have to make some stipulations 
about what counts for sameness and difference in the case of imaginary 
statues. Considerations of this sort would obviously play a major role in any 
argument designed to discredit speaking of particular imaginary individuaIs. 
But does the fact that there are these important differences between imagi- 
nary and real individuals imply that talk of having some definite individual 
in mind who never will exist is completely wrongheaded? 
Here we need to recall what led us to speak this way in the first place. 
Sometimes we talk about an individual who falls under a certain description 
(e.g., 'the present editor of Mind') without knowing who that individual is. 
Thus I might say, "The present editor of Mind (whoever he is) didn't think 
much of the paper I sent him." And sometimes we talk about an individual 
when we know perfectly well whom we are talking about. Thus, I might say, 
"The previous editor of Mind didn't much care for it either." One might 
characterize a significant difference between these two cases by saying that 
in the former I had no one in particular in mind while in the latter case 1 
did, namely, Professor Ryle. 
A quite similar contrast can be made in the case of talk about imaginary 
individuals. I might say, "The main character in Dickens' last novel (whoever 
he or she is) was probably as finely drawn as Mr. Pickwick." Here we have 
one remark about two individuals, the main character of Dickens' last novel 
and Mr. Pickwick. Although there is a sense in which I am talking about the 
main character in Dickens' last novel, since I do not know who this is, I do 
not have someone in mind, and I do not know which character I am speaking 
about. In contrast, my remark was also about Mr. Pickwick, and here I did 
have someone in mind and I do know which character I am speaking about. 
Most of you have probably noticed that the contrast drawn in the preceding 
paragraph involves what Ryle calls reproductive imagining. Is there a parallel 
in the case of constructive imagining? The difficulty here is in getting a case 
of talking about someone, we know not whom, when the someone in question 
is an individual we have created by our own constructive imagining. Incertain 
respects this just is a significant difference between constructive and repro- 
ductive imagining which should not be obliterated. But even here there is 
a distinction which resembles the contrasts drawn above. RecaIl the case of 
Joan of Arc's daughter. In our imaginary tale, we left Joan just as she had 
boi-ne a daughter. We had not yet "given" the daughter many specific charac- 
teristics at all. (But of course it would be mistaken to say that what we had 
imagined was an individual without many specific characteristics. What 
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would it be to imagine someone who was just someone's daughter and had 
no other features at all?) In this respect Joan's daughter differs somewhat 
from the Socrates Apollo. We "fleshed out" this statue to some extent and 
thus are in a position to compare it with, and distinguish it from, other statues 
both real and imaginary. Provided this "fleshing out" were done in sufficient 
detail, it would be appropriate to mark the distinction between the cases of 
imagining Joan of Arc's daughter and the Socrates Apollo by saying that in 
the latter case we had a more or less definite individual in mind while in 
the former we did not. 
By stressing similarities among talk about real individuals, individuals 
imagined first by others, and individuals which are products of our own 
imagining, I have tried to show that in each of these contexts there is a place 
for the notions of having a definite individual in mind, knowing whom or 
what you are taIking about, and being able to say which of the so-and-so's 
(persons, characters, or statues) one is talking about. But even if these points 
are granted, there are other worries. Even granting that in cases both of 
constructive and of reproductive imagining the imaginer can have a definite 
individual in mind, we can still wonder how it is possible for the imaginer 
to talk about that individual. More specifically, how is it possible to refer 
to that individual, i.e., to identify him for our audience? 
1v 
There are at least two sources of puzzlement here. One is a certain view 
or picture of what makes reference possible, and the other is a view as to 
what it means to say of something that it exists. When one combines these 
views one gets the following results: 
1 believe that a lot of people are tempted to hold the erroneous belief that imaginary 
objects are objects with a special status because they suppose that an act of imagining 
has an object in the special sense of being correlated with a namable or describable 
thing, in the same sort of way as acts of seeing, fearing, hitting, making and begetting 
are correlated with namable or describable things. . . .I  have, of course, already given 
the crucial reason why imagining cannot be correlative to an imaginary object- 
namely, that it is a tautology to say that imaginary objects do not exist. So there could 
be 120 such correlnte~.'~ 
Throughout this paper 1 have taken pains to avoid assigning imaginary 
objects a special status, and I have especially tried to avoid saying that imagi- 
nary objects exist. But I have not tried to avoid saying that some acts of 
imagining are "correlated with a namable or describable thing" since I think 
this is indeed the case. Are there any good reasons for thinking that the 
Socrates Apollo is not describable? Consider the following observation: 
A descriptive phrase is not a proper name, and the way in which the subject of 
attributes which it denotes is denoted by it is not in that subject's being called 'the 
so and so,' but in its possessing and being ipso facto the sole possessor of the idiosyn- 
cratic attribute which is what the descriptive phrase signifies." 
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Now if this is correct and if there are reasons for thinking that the Socrates 
Apollo could not possess such an "idiosyncratic attribute," then we might 
have grounds for saying that the Socrates Apollo could not be described in 
the requisite sense. I believe both of these suppositions are false. 
If we gloss 'subject of attributes denoted by a phrase' as 'subject of attri- 
butes to which a phrase is used to refer,' it is clearly false that we can only 
refer to something with a descriptive phrase if that phrase signifies an idio- 
syncratic attribute of the thing in question. In suitable circumstances I can 
refer to Rice's philosophy department with the phrase 'the department' even 
though the said department is not alone in possessing the attribute signified 
by my phrase. I can even refer to something with a phrase which signifies 
an attribute that the object of reference does not possess. Consider the follow- 
ing imaginary case: 
Suppose (as 1s the case) that Professor Ryle has retired from his position as the editor 
of Mind. Suppose further (as is not the case) that no one has been named to succeed him 
in his position. Under these Imagined conditions it would of course be quite possible for 
someone mistakenly to think that Professor Ryle still held his old position. Upon hearing 
that Professor Ryle was to visit the Rice University campus, such a person might well 
relate the good news to his acquaintances by exclaiming, "The (present) editor of M ~ n d  
is coming to Rlce." 
Not only does it seem correct to say in this case that Professor Ryle was 
referred to, but it also seems that the reference could be successful, that is, 
the speaker could use the phrase to get his audience to know whom he was 
talking about. Such successful reference could occur if the speaker's audience 
shared his particular misconceptions, or if they were aware of his misconcep- 
tions without sharing them, or if they already knew of Professor Ryle's visit. 
Here it will be objected that the switch from 'subject of attributes denoted 
by a phrase' to 'subject of attributes to which a phrase is used to refer' is 
in some way illegitimate. There are important differences here, but when the 
issue at stake is what we can or cannot talk about, the relevant concern is 
surely that of what we can or cannot use a phrase to refer to. 
But even if it is not necessary to use a description which signifies an idio- 
syncratic attribute of the Socrates Apollo in order to refer to it with a descrip- 
tion, there is still a worry about saying that the Socrates Apollo possesses any 
attributes at all. For if something were to possess an attribute, it might seem 
that for that very reason it would exist. 
Of course, there is a sense in which any character [attribute] whatsoever involves 
existence.. . . What has a qual~ty or stands in a relation or is of a kind ipsofacto exists.'" 
Rather, though this is again misleading, a thing's being real or being an entity or 
being an object just consists in the fact that it has attributes.'" 
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TO say of a named or described something that it is not real or is not an object or 
entity must be nonsensical. For its having that name or description is already a case 
of possessing an attribute, whereas the denial that it was real or was an entity was 
the denial that 'it' possessed any attributes." 
This last quotation connects Ryle's views on what it is to exist with his objec- 
tion to saying that imaginary individuals are nameable or describable. To 
possess a name or to be correctly describable as a so-and-so is to possess at 
least one attribute, and to possess an attribute is to exist. Thus things which 
do not exist are neither nameable nor describable. 
Yet surely something is wrong here. How could possessing the attribute 
of having a name "make" something real? Perhaps we need to distinguish 
among attributes. Possibly having a name, being describable, and being ima- 
gined" are not the sort of attributes which are such that to possess them is 
to exist. But what attributes are of this kind? Even attributes like "is green" 
and "was Prime Minister" seem to be such that an imaginary individual could 
possess them without existing. In fact, within certain limitations (which would 
be quite difficult to spell out in a non-question-begging way) it seems that 
you can choose any attribute you please, and if we cannot think of an imagi- 
nary individual which possesses that attribute, then through constructive 
imagining we should be able to create one. 
Here it will be objected that though we cannot isolate from all attributes 
those whose possession amounts to existence, there is a natural sense of 'to 
possess an attribute' in which to possess any attribute at all is to exist. But 
what is this sense of 'to possess an attribute'? A candidate which would work 
can be found in Lewis' definition of the notion of the denotation of a term: 
"The denotation of a term is the class of all actual or existent things to which 
that term correctly applies."'"f there were some natural sense of 'to possess 
an attribute' in which to possess an attribute was to belong to the denotation 
of some term, to possess an attribute would be to exist. For to belong to a 
class of existent things is surely to exist. However, I deny that Lewis' definition 
of denotation can be used in this way to provide us with something that could 
legitimately be called a distinguishable sense of 'possessing an attribute.' My 
reasons for this denial were mentioned earlier, but need restating. 
Suppose I imagine the Socrates Apollo as being made of marble. To put 
what I have imagined in attribute jargon, I have imagined that the Socrates 
Apollo possesses the attribute "being composed of marble." But what sense 
should we attach to the phrase 'possesses the attribute' as it occurs in the 
above sentence? If we are to come up with a correct description of what I 
have imagined, we must say, "exactly the same sense as the phrase has in 
the following remark: The Apollo from the west pediment of the Temple of 
Zeus at Olympia possesses the attribute of being composed of marble." To 
be sure the two claims, "the Socrates Apollo is composed of marble" and "the 
Olympia Apollo is composed of marble," have different "implications" and 
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wouldperlzaps be verified in interestingly different ways. But these differences 
cannot be traced to differences of the attributes predicated or differences in 
the way the two statues are said to possess their respective attributes. However 
much one admires the metaphysical housecleaning inspired by the notion 
that to possess an attribute is to exist, accepting this notion seems to involve 
us in the multiplication of senses beyond intelligibility. 
In this paper I have tried to defend the claim that one can imagine, think 
about, talk about, and refer to things which never will exist. And I have tried 
to present my defense without committing myself to the position that these 
things must in some sense be or exist. To the extent that I have achieved 
this latter objective I am in accord with one of the primary aims of Professor 
Ryle in his early works. But even though my former objective does not itself 
involve metaphysical inflation, it may lower some of the barriers against the 
inflationists which others would wish to keep up. Of course L am still a long 
way from my ultimate objective of saying something about what might have 
existed but will not. But before pursuing this objective, I should give Professor 
Ryle a chance to point out what is wrong with my attempts to date. 
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